Since many efficient algorithms for implementing pairings have been proposed such as η T pairing and the Ate pairing, pairings could be used in constraint devices such as smart cards. However, the secure implementation of pairings has not been thoroughly investigated. In this paper, we investigate the security of η T pairing over binary fields in the context of side-channel attacks. We propose efficient and secure η T pairing algorithms using randomized projective coordinate systems for computing the pairing.
I. Introduction
Since pairings have new and useful cryptographic properties such as bilinearity and non-degeneracy, there has been a great deal of recent interest and active research into them in the field of cryptography. Recently, many cryptographic schemes based on Tate pairing and Weil pairing have been proposed. For example, identity-based encryption schemes [1] , [2] , identitybased signature schemes [3] - [5] short signature scheme [6] , and identity-based authenticated key agreement scheme [7] .
To facilitate the practical application of pairing-based schemes, much work has focused on the development of efficient and easy computations of pairings on elliptic curves. Barreto and others [8] and Galbraith and others [9] provided the fast computation of the Tate pairing on supersingular elliptic curves defined over finite fields of characteristics two and three. Duursma and Lee [10] gave a closed formula in the case of characteristic three, and Kwon [11] extended it to supersingular curves in characteristic two. Barreto and others [12] proposed η T pairing, which is a general technique for the efficient computation of pairings on supersingular Abelian varieties.
Recently, such methods for computing pairings have been implemented in software and hardware for application in constrained devices, such as smartcards [13] - [17] . In the implementation of cryptosystems or protocols on such devices, we should consider both efficiency and security. If cryptosystems are not carefully implemented on constrained devices, they could be insecure against side-channel attacks (SCAs). Therefore, it is important to consider the secure implementation of pairing-based cryptosystems against SCAs.
Pairing-based schemes can be divided into two types according to whether or not the input of a pairing is secret [18] .
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For example, identity-based signature schemes, such as the short signature scheme proposed by Boneh and Franklin, require secret information as an input (such as, the secret scalar) of the elliptic curve scalar multiplication, not of the pairing. SCAs and countermeasures on scalar multiplications have been thoroughly studied. However, identity-based encryption schemes, such as the Boneh-Franklin encryption scheme [1] use secret information as an input of the pairing. In this case, there are only a few studies of SCAs on these pairings [19] - [22] . In [19] , Page and Vercauteren described SCAs against the Duursma-Lee algorithm and the BKLS algorithm. They focused SCAs on a multiplication operation over characteristic three. In [21] , Scott suggested countermeasures to provide resistance to more sophisticated simple power analysis (SPA) attacks and differential power analysis (DPA) attacks. Very recently, Whelan and Scott discussed the security of practical pairings (Tate, η T , and Ate pairing), which include the case of characteristic two, using correlation power analysis (CPA) [22] . In particular, they investigated all field operations used in the η T pairing over characteristic two. However, in this paper, we describe the difference between finite field multiplications used in the η T pairings over characteristic two and three. Then, we concretely examine the security of the η T pairing on supersingular curves over F 2 m against timing attacks (TAs), SPA attacks and DPA attacks, which are different from Whelan-Scott attacks.
In general, to speed up elliptic curve point addition and doubling, projective coordinate systems are used instead of the affine coordinate system because the affine coordinate system requires a modular inversion operation, which is computationally expensive. In [23] , Izu and Takagi showed that the Tate pairing on general elliptic curves over prime fields F p m is efficiently computed using projective coordinate systems. In [24] , Chatterjee and others considered the use of Jacobian coordinates for Tate pairing computation in general characteristics. In [25] , Hess and others proposed Ate pairing, which is an extension of η T pairing of supersingular curves to general curves over prime fields F p m , and examined efficiency in the projective coordinate systems. To provide protection against SCAs, Coron [26] used randomized projective coordinates. In this paper, to resist SCAs, we propose explicit algorithms using the randomness of projective coordinate systems in the η T pairing for a curve in characteristic two. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review several methods for the efficient computation of Tate pairing. Section III describes side-channel attacks on the η T pairing of supersingular curves in characteristic two. Section IV presents countermeasures to prevent the attacks described in Section III. Section V compares the proposed countermeasure with previous methods. Finally, we conclude in Section VI.
II. Tate Pairing
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field F q . The number of points in E(F q ), called the order of the elliptic curve group, is denoted by #E(F q ). Let l be a positive integer coprime to q, which divides the order of the elliptic curve E(F q ), that is, l | #E(F q ). Then, E has embedding degree or security parameter k with respect to l if k is the smallest positive integer such that the subgroup order l divides (q k -1) but does not divide (q i -1) for any 1<i<k.
A divisor D on E is a formal sum of the points P on the curve D = ∑n P (P), where n P ∈Z, and n P = 0 for all but finitely many P∈E. The support of a divisor D is the set of points such that n P ≠ 0.
Let f : E(F q k) → F q k be a rational function on E. Given a nonzero rational function f, the divisor of f is defined as (f) = ∑ord P (f)(P), where ord P (f) is the order of the zero or pole of f at P (if f has no zero or pole at P , then ord P (f) = 0). A divisor D is called principal if D = (f) for some rational function f. It is well known that a divisor D = ∑n P (P) is principal if, and only if, ∑n P = 0 and ∑[n P ]P = O, where O denotes the point at infinity [27] .
and D be a divisor equivalent to (P) -(O). Then nD is principal, and thus, there is a rational function f l,P such that (f l,
The Tate pairing of order l is defined as follows.
Definition 1.
The Tate pairing is a map
such that D Q and (f l,P ) have disjoint supports, and μ l is the subgroup of l-th roots of unity of F * q k.
The first efficient method for computing such a rational function was proposed by Miller [27] . This algorithm is based on the binary method for elliptic curve scalar multiplication combined with an evaluation of the tangent lines used in the elliptic curve addition process. In the original Miller algorithm, a denominator in the step of an evaluation of the tangent lines should be computed. Barreto and others [8] demonstrated a method to speed up the computation by eliminating the denominator. For supersingular elliptic curves, they used a specific endomorphism ψ : E(F q )[l] →E [l] such that the image is linearly independent of E(F q ) [l] . Such a map is called a distortion map [28] . Therefore, the modified Tate pairing of P and Q on E(F q ) of order l is defined as follows.
Definition 2.
Let E be a supersingular elliptic curve over a finite field F q . For P, Q∈E(F q )[l], the modified Tate pairing with an endomorphism ψ is defined by
To improve the computation speed of this pairing on curves, we can use N = hl as a multiple of the order of the elliptic curve for some integer h instead of l [9] . Since (f N,P ) = h(f l,P ) = (f l,P h ) the Tate pairing can be computed by f N,P (ψ(Q)) M , where M = (q k -1)/N, N = hl , and f N,P is a rational function such that (f N,P ) = N(P) -(N)(O). Using this property, Duursma and Lee [10] and Kwon [11] replaced l by N = hl, which has low Hamming weight in the cases of characteristics three and two. In characteristic two, that is, q = 2 m , the order and the embedding degree of supersingular curves E: [10] , [11] . The fastest method for computing the Tate pairing on supersingular curves is η T pairing [12] , which includes the algorithms by Duursma and Lee [10] and Kwon [11] as special cases. 
The following relation exists between the η T pairing and the Tate pairing. We now present an outline of the η T pairing algorithm. The elliptic curve we are interested in is the supersingular curve E:
, where m ≡ 3 mod 8 and b∈ F 2 . To reduce the number of loops by half, we can choose N = #E(
and L = 2. The η T pairing computes the Miller function f T,P , which requires (m-1)/2 elliptic curve doublings and one elliptic curve addition. Given a point P = (x P , y P ), the tangent line in doubling P is given by g P (x, y) = (x P 2 + 1)(x P + x) + y P + y. The function g P has divisor 2(P) + ([-2]P) -3(O). Hence, by the definition of the η T pairing, we have ( ) 
, y P
), where φ(x,y) = (x+1,y+x), and x (j) denotes 2 . In case of m ≡ 3 mod 8, 2
). Thus, the function
is given by
The concrete algorithm of the η T pairing on supersingular curves in characteristic two with m ≡ 3 mod 8 is shown in algorithm 1.
over F 2 m where m ≡ 3 mod 8 and b∈ F 2 [12] Input: P = (x P , y P ) and Q = (x Q , y Q ). Output: η T (P,Q).
However, to obtain the same result as the Tate pairing, it must be further exponentiated to the power of T because of the following relation between the η T pairing and the Tate pairing:
.
III. Side-Channel Attacks
SCAs have been recognized as serious menaces to constrained devices, such as smartcards. By monitoring computation timing, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, and so on during cryptographic operations, it is possible to recover the secret information related to the keys inside the device [26] , [29] . TAs analyze the time taken to execute cryptographic algorithms. SPA attacks directly interpret power consumption measurements collected during cryptographic operations. DPA attacks analyze the correlation between the secret and the power consumption and specific key-dependent intermediate values which appear during computation. These attacks use statistical tools and error correction techniques.
In this section we investigate the η T pairing used in identitybased encryption schemes, such as Boneh-Franklin encryption scheme [1] and the Sakai-Kasahara encryption scheme [2] in the context of SCAs, such as TAs, SPAs, and DPAs.
Weak Points in Pairing Computation
In the decryption step of identity-based encryption schemes, a dominant operation is e(S ID ,U), where S ID is the fixed secret key, and U is a part of a ciphertext. In this case, SCAs may try to extract the secret key from the pairing computation by repeatedly manipulating U. Recently, Page and Vercauteren [19] presented SPA and DPA attacks on a field multiplication step of the pairing computation with the secret value. They showed that there are such field multiplications in the Duursma-Lee algorithm [10] and the BLKS algorithm [8] of characteristic three, that is, the multiplication of y and r where y is an unknown and fixed value related with the y-coordinate of the secret point S ID , and r is a known and variable value related with the ciphertext U. The process of a field multiplication such as the binary method or m-array method is analogous to that of exponentiation on a multiplicative group or scalar multiplication on an additive group since the multiplicand is processed one bit or m bits at a time. Thus, we can easily apply DPA attacks as in [30] .
However, the η T pairing in characteristic two includes the multiplication of the different form a(b+r) compared with the case of characteristic three, where both a and b are unknown and are related to the secret value S ID . In this case, since r is chosen by an attacker and is added to by an unknown value b, we may not simulate or guess an intermediate value related with the secret value. Thus, the Page-Vercauteren attack cannot be directly applied to the η T pairing over characteristic two, and it seems secure against SCAs. However, in this paper, we will show that the addition and the multiplication of a(b+r) can be vulnerable to DPA attacks and TA or SPA attacks.
A. Assumption
From this section on, we assume that the first input P = (x P ,y P ) of the pairing in algorithm 1 is secret, and the second input Q = (x Q ,y Q ) is public and known to or even chosen by the attacker. Note, however, that the descriptions of the attacks are similar even if P is public and Q is secret. For the computation of a(b+r), we also assume that the addition (b+r) is computed before the multiplication. Then the multiplication a(b+r) is computed. We assume that the multiplication is computed by the right-to-left binary method.
Finite Field Arithmetic
Let f(x) be an irreducible polynomial of degree m over F 2 . 
m are performed as follows.
• Addition:
, where c is computed as a multiplication of polynomials a(x) and
The addition of the two elements a and b in F 2 m is easily performed by a bitwise XOR operation. A general method of multiplying the two elements a and b of F 2 m is done by scanning one bit of the multiplier b at a time. This method is known as the binary method and is based on the following observation:
. For efficiency, the irreducible polynomial is selected as a trinomial or a pentanomial. Therefore, we assume that a multiplication of polynomials is performed before modulo reduction. Then, the result is reduced by an irreducible polynomial. Note, however, that the attack is not limited to the previous multiplication and the separate computation of multiplication and reduction. This attack can be extended to other multiplication methods and the interleaving multiplication and reduction method. An algorithm of the binary method is given in algorithm 2.
SPA or Timing Attack
We consider the multiplication a(x)(b(x)+r(x)). If a(x) is a multiplier, the addition is performed depending on whether a i = 1. 
m when a(x) is a multiplier and b(x) + r(x) is a multiplicand. The addition must be performed before the multiplication.
The structure of the right-to-left method for the multiplication of a(x)(b(x)+r(x)) is shown in Fig. 1 .
Page and Vercauteren [19] first presented an SPA attack against a(x)r(x) in F 3 m , where a(x) is secret and r(x) is public. It assumes that this conditional branch is vulnerable to TA or SPA attacks [26] , [29] . Thus, we can also recover u of u(x P +x Q ), which is a part of step 5 of algorithm 1, even though x P + x Q is unknown. In this case, u is the x-coordinate of the secret point P. Then, we can find the y-coordinate from the x-coordinate by solving the quadratic equation of elliptic curves.
However, if b(x)+r(x) is a multiplier, then the conditional branch occurs, depending on b i +r i . If we can detect an appearance of the conditional branch by a TA or SPA attack, then b i ≠ r i . Otherwise, b i = r i . Thus, since x P and x Q of algorithm 1 correspond to b i and r i , we can recover x P by controlling x Q in u(x P +x Q ). Since x P is the square root of the xcoordinate of the secret point P, we can obtain the x-coordinate by squaring x P and then obtain the y-coordinate from the xcoordinate of the secret point P.
DPA Attacks
In this section, we investigate DPA attacks against the addition b(x)+r(x) and the multiplication of a(x) and (b(x)+r(x)) used in the η T pairing on supersingular curves in characteristic two, where a(x) and b(x) are secret and are related to the secret value x P , and r(x) is public and known to, or even chosen by, the attacker. To ease the explanation we consider the simplified Hamming weight model for power leakage [31] . In this model, power consumption depends on the Hamming weight of the data being processed. Thus, we can express the power consumption W as
where H, ε, and n represent the Hamming weight of the intermediate data, the incremental amount of power for each extra 1 in the Hamming weight, and the noise, respectively. We assume that the average of noise n is zero.
A. Attack on the Addition
The addition of
Let W be the power consumption associated with the addition operation b(x)+r(x). To recover the i-th bit of b(x), we guess that b i =0 and divide power consumptions into two sets by r i . In summary, since the addition operation (x P +x Q ) of step 5 in algorithm 1 is vulnerable to the previous analysis, we can recover x P . From this value, we can obtain the x-and ycoordinates of the secret point P.
B. Attack on the Multiplication
Since DPA attacks use correlation between power consumptions and specific key-dependent intermediate values that appear during computation related with the secret, it is important to examine the intermediate values appearing in algorithm 2 for computing the multiplication of a(x) and (b(x)+r(x)). We will treat two cases: one in which a(x) is a multiplier and b(x)+r(x) is a multiplicand and one in which the opposite is true. Theorem 1. In algorithm 2, if a(x) is a multiplier and b(x)+r(x) is a multiplicand, then the algorithm is vulnerable to the DPA attack.
Proof. In this case, the multiplication is performed as follows:
). In describing how to recover a(x), assume the lowest bits a i-1 ,…, a 0 of the secret multiplier a(x) are already recovered. We describe how to find the next bit a i .
In algorithm 2, the intermediate value obtained at the end of i-th step of the loop is
The i-th bit of (3) In summary, since the multiplication of u(x P +x Q ) of step 5 in algorithm 1 is vulnerable to the proposed attack, we can recover u, the x-coordinate of the secret point P, even though x P + x Q is unknown. Finally, we can obtain the y-coordinate from the x-coordinate by solving the quadratic equation of elliptic curves.
IV. Proposed Countermeasure
The attack described in section III is possible when we can choose and control an input value and simulate the intermediate results. To resist such attacks for elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECCs), Coron [26] proposed three methods to securely compute scalar multiplication [d]P, where d is the secret key, and P is public. Let E be an elliptic curve over finite fields F q . Let #E be the number of points of the curve. The countermeasures for computing Q = [d]P are the following:
1. Randomization of the private value, that is, [d]P = [(d+r#E)]P for a random number r∈ F q .
Blinding the public value, that is, [d]P = [d](P+R) -[d]R for a random point R on E(F q ).
3. Randomizing projective coordinates, that is, (X; Y; Z) = (rX; rY; rZ) for a random value r ≠ 0 in F q .
In the context of the above techniques, Page and Vercauteren [19] and Scott [21] proposed some methods for the pairings. First, they used bilinearity to randomize the private data, that is,
e(P,Q) = e([s]P, [t]P)
1/st where s and t are random variables.
Furthermore, the exponentiation to the power 1/st can be removed by selecting s and t satisfying st = 1 mod l, where l is the order of the underlying elliptic curve for the pairing [19] . Second, they presented a method for blinding the input point by the relation e(P,Q) = e(P,Q+R)e(P,R) -1 [20] .
In [21] , Scott introduced a method which multiplies intermediate values appearing during the loop by a random value in F q . To prevent the DPA attacks described in the previous section, all intermediate variables (not only g) in step 2 and step 5 of algorithm 1 must be multiplied by a random value. Thus, steps 2 and 5 should be respectively changed into f = u(ru + rx Q ) + ry P + r(y Q + b + 1) + (ru + rx Q )s + rt and g = u(rx P + rx Q ) + ry P + ry Q + rx P + (ru + rx Q )s + rt.
Projective Coordinates Randomization
We propose explicit algorithms for the η T pairing using projective coordinates to resist DPA attacks. To show that it is the fastest method among existing countermeasures, we estimate computational efficiency between the proposed method and previous countermeasures. In [32] , they only considered the case of the randomization of public point Q. In this paper, we consider two cases: the randomization of public point P and secret point Q. We will show that the randomization of Q is faster than that of P as in [32] . We will next describe how to securely compute the η T pairing using randomized projective coordinates in the case of characteristic two. The following lemma helps to construct a projective coordinate version of the η T pairing. In particular, when α = β = 1 they are called standard projective coordinates, and when α = 2 and β = 3 they are called Jacobian coordinates.
For projective point P=(X, Y, Z),
, Z
), where φ(X, Y, Z)=(X+Z, Y+X, Z).

A. Randomization of P in Weighted Coordinates
First, we consider the randomization of P = (x P , y P ) in weighted coordinates ( / , / )
Theorem 3. For weighted projective coordinates of an affine point P = (x P , y P ), we can set / 
( 1 ) 0
Proof. In (2), substituting x P and y P by / P P X Z α and / P P Y Z β and using the preceding notations, we have
( ( ))
. 
Proof. In theorem 3, if α = β = 1, then the equation of theorem 3 is simplified. With the preceding notations,
. does not effect the result, so this term can be eliminated. Thus, g 0 , g 1 , and g 2 require 4, 2, and 1 multiplication(s) in F 2 m , respectively.
We illustrate an explicit algorithm of corollary 1 in algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3. η T (P,Q) on the elliptic curve E: Y
m where m ≡ 3 mod 8 and b ∈ F 2 via randomized projective coordinates of P Input: P = (x P , y P ) and Q = (x Q , y Q ). Output: η T (P,Q). 
In (2) 
Proof. In theorem 4, if α = β = 1, then the equation of theorem 4 is simplified. With the preceding notations,
. We illustrate an explicit algorithm of corollary 2 in algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4. η T (P,Q) on the elliptic curve E: Y
m where m ≡ 3 mod 8 and b∈ F 2 via randomized projective coordinates of Q Input: P = (x P , y P ) and Q = (x Q , y Q ). Output: η T (P,Q).
Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security of the proposed algorithms against SPA, DPA, and the refined power analysis (RPA).
A. Security against SPA
The SPA of section III.3 retrieves the operation sequence by detecting the conditional branch depending on the secret parameter. Thus, a simple way to avoid SPAs is for the multiplier to use public values known to or even chosen by attackers and for the multiplicand to use secret values.
B. Security against DPA
Since DPAs exploit the correlation between intermediate results and secret parameters, the target of a DPA is intermediate data. The problem of the original η T pairing is that the secret values are fixed values even though attackers do not know or predict the values. To overcome this weakness, we change the secret value or the public value using randomized projective coordinates at each execution.
In algorithm 3, the secret values are blinded by a random element λ in F 2 m at each new execution of the algorithm, so the grouping depending on the secret value in DPA is meaningless. More precisely, we check the intermediate values that appear during the process of algorithm 3. In step 3, the computation in relation to the secret values is as follows:
λ λ λ λ λ
)
In step 6 of the first loop, that is, the case of i = 0, the computation in relation to the secret values is as follows:
In the preceding six computations, all intermediate variables are blinded by the random element λ. Therefore, algorithm 3 is secure against DPA.
In algorithm 4 the public values known to or chosen by the attacker are randomized and are blinded by a random element λ in F 2 m at each new execution of the algorithm. Therefore, it is not possible for the attacker to predict any specific bit of the intermediate value. More precisely, we check the intermediate values that appear during the process of algorithm 4. In step 3, the computation in relation to the secret values is as follows:
i. ( 1)( ( 1) ) ( 1)( ( 1) )
In step 6 of the first loop, that is, the case of i = 0, the computation in relation to the secret values is as follows: Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that a(x) is a multiplier and (b(x)λ(x) + r(x)λ(x)) is a multiplicand. To ease the description, we assume that b(x)λ(x) and r(x)λ(x) are the results of only polynomial multiplication. However, if the reduction is performed, then the attack could be more difficult.
Similar to the proof of theorem 1, the intermediate value obtained at the end of the i-th step of the loop in the multiplication algorithm, that is, algorithm 2, is
The i-th bit of the above value is
By rearranging, we have
The probability of correctly guessing for (7) )) is a multiplicand. Therefore, the computation is secure against the DPA attack.
By theorem 5, the first computation and the fourth computation are also secure against DPA attack. Thus, we can conclude that algorithms 3 and 4 are secure against DPA attack.
C. Security against RPA
In ECC, the randomized projective coordinate is vulnerable to RPA [33] and zero-value point attack (ZVPA) [34] . The RPA detects whether a "special point," such as (x,0) or (0,y) appears during a scalar multiplication. The appearance of a special point depends on the secret scalar. For example, if we use the base point P = (d -1 mod #E)(x,0) for some secret integer d, then the RPA can successfully detect the appearance of the special point (x,0) during the scalar multiplication dP when the guess for the secret scalar is correct.
In the field multiplication, we have to find a special element in F 2 m having properties similar to those of the special point. Then, we use b = a -1 γ for some secret value a, where γ is the special element. However, when the secret value a is randomized by a random element λ, that is, a′ = aλ, the intermediate value during the multiplication of a′ and b is aλa -1 γ = λγ. We cannot detect the appearance of the special element γ. On the other hand, when the selected value is randomized by a random element λ, that is, b′ = a -1 γλ, the intermediate value during the multiplication of a and b′ is aa -1 γλ = γλ. Therefore, the RPA-like attack does not defeat the multiplication with randomized inputs.
V. Efficiency Comparison
We first estimate the computational cost of the proposed algorithms. From now on, we denote the computation time of a squaring, a multiplication and an inversion in F 2 km as S k , M k , and I k . In particular, we denote the computation time of a squaring, a multiplication and an inversion in F 2 m as S, M, and I, that is, S 1 = S, M 1 = M, and I 1 = I. Moreover, we denote the computation time of a square root as S because the method described in [35] for computing square roots in F 2 m is as fast as squaring. Because addition in F 2 m is relatively inexpensive compared to multiplication and inversion, we can ignore the cost of field additions [36] .
Because the extension field F 2 4m is represented by the basis {1, with the basis {1, t} because F 2 4m is a quadratic extension of F 2 2m .
Then g and f are represented as 
Because F 2 2m is also a quadratic extension of F 2 m , if we repeatedly apply the Kararsuba technique, M 2 is performed in 3M. Finally, we can compute h = fg = (h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ) by 9M.
In algorithm 1, since g 2 = g 3 = 0, the preceding formula is simplified as follows and is performed by 6M [12] :
In the original η T pairing, the initial step requires 1M, and each loop requires 7M + 4S, where 1M is used to compute g and 6M at step 6 because of the sparse form of g, in addition to two square roots at step 4 and two squarings at step 7. Thus, since the number of iterations is (m+1)/2, the total cost of the original η T pairing is (7M + 4S)(m+1)/2 + 1M, that is, (3.5M + 2S)(m + 1) + 1M. However, algorithm 3 requires 7M at the initial stage, 2M at step 1, 5M at step 3, 6M at step 6, and 8M at step 7. Algorithm 4 requires 5M at the initial step, 2M at step 1,3M at step 3, 4M at step 6, and 8M at step 7. In both the proposed algorithms, since g 3 = 0, the formula is simplified as
The main loop of both proposed algorithms also requires 5S. The cost of the main loop of algorithms 3 and 4 is (14M + 5S) (m+1)/2 and (12M + 5S)(m+1)/2, respectively. Therefore, the total costs of algorithms 3 and 4 are (14M + 5S)(m+1)/2 + 7M, that is, (7M + 2.5S)(m + 1) + 7M and (12M + 5S)(m+1)/2 + 5M, that is, (6M + 2.5S)(m + 1) + 5M, respectively. The total cost of the η T pairing (except for the final exponentiation) is shown in Table 1 .
Thus, we can deduce that algorithm 4 is more efficient than algorithm 3. The additional cost of algorithm 4 over the original η T pairing, including the initial step, is (2.5M + 0.5S)(m + 1) + 4M.
We now compare computational efficiency of the techniques described in section IV. First, the method using bilinearity additionally requires 2 scalar multiplications. In supersingular curves, doubling a point requires 4S, and adding two distinct points requires 1S + 2M + 1I [27] . If we use the binary method for scalar multiplication, the cost of two scalar multiplications is 2m elliptic curve doublings and m elliptic curve additions on average. The additional cost of this method is approximately (2M + 9S + I)m. Thus, when I < 0.5M this method is more efficient than the proposed method. It is practically infeasible. In general, the ratio of the fastest inversion method to the fastest multiplication is approximately 10 to 1, that is, I = 10M [36] . In this case, the additional cost of this method is approximately (12M + 9S)m.
Second, the method of e(P,Q) = e(P,Q+R)e(P,R) -1 additionally requires 1 pairing computation, 1M 4 , and 1I 4 . The computational cost of the η T pairing, that is, algorithm 1, is Similarly, I 2 can be computed with 3M and 1I. Since M 2 = 3M and I = 10M, I 4 and I 2 can be computed by 22M and 13M. The computational cost of the final exponentiation is 2M 4 + 5M 2 + (m+1)/2C 4 + I 4 + I 2 = 68M + 2(m+1)C. Therefore, the additional cost of this method is (3.5M + 4C) (m + 1) + 69M.
In Scott's method [21] , that is, randomization of intermediate variables, the additional cost over the η T pairing is 3.5M(m + 1) + 4M. We give a comparison table of the number of operations 
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the security of the η T pairing on supersingular curves over characteristic two against timing attack, SPA and DPA. To avoid such attacks we proposed explicit algorithms of the η T pairing using randomized projective coordinates. We demonstrated that the proposed method is the most efficient countermeasure compared with previous techniques. We further demonstrated that the proposed algorithms are secure against SPA, DPA, and RPA. However, the proposed algorithms could be susceptible to higher-order DPA attacks. Thus, a direction for further research would be to investigate security against higher-order DPA.
